# COMPUTER SECURITY

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# Cryptography: the security mechanism <sup>1</sup>

«Sxw#pruh#frgh/#jhu#pruh#exjv1#»

(Caeser's cipher adapted to Latin 1 (ISO 8859-1) table; French quotes are just delimiters.)



1 However, keep in mind: «*Cryptography is rarely ever the solution to a security problem.*» (D. Gollmann, Computer Security, p. 203)

# Basics

- Originally:
  - science (and art) of secret writing
  - o aimed to hinder the knowledge of sensitive information
- Currently:
  - science (and art) of providing protection mechanisms to ensure security properties (confidentiality, integrity...)
  - $\circ$  aims to permit control of access to information
- Relevant types of professionals:
  - <u>cryptographers</u> try to master and enhance that access control
  - <u>cryptanalysts</u> try to break the enabled access control

# **Practical uses**

- Traditional:
  - **conceal** information P, by making it unintelligible (C)
- Modern:
  - unambiguously **identify** information *P*, by means of its *fingerprint* (hash, *h*)

## Traditional use of Cryptography

- information *P* is <u>enciphered</u>, i.e. made unintelligible, *C*
- elsewhere or later, *C* will be <u>deciphered</u>, to retrieve original information *P*
- both operations are usually assisted by (cryptographic) keys<sup>1</sup>, *K*.



Fig. Original Cryptography: basic model of concealment and recovery of info & examples of attacks (*in* several of Tanenbaum's books).

1 pieces of information necessary for using cryptographic security mechanisms (more info, later!)

# Added newer usage of Cryptography

- information *P* is *fingerprinted*, by calculating its *digest*, or *hash*<sup>1</sup> *h* (array of bytes)
- elsewhere or later, *h* will be used again to detect the adulteration of the original information *P*
- usually, *hashing*<sup>2</sup>:
  - produces same-size values (different for each *P*!)
  - does without (cryptographic) keys



Fig. Modern Cryptography: basic model for the validation of info (e.g. integrity protection). Note the need for a protected channel!

1 PT: síntese, sumário

2 Note: *cryptographic* hashing is different from *database* hashing.

# Generic Cryptographic System

So, involves:

- *P*, plaintext<sup>1</sup> original, uncovered information
- *E*, enciphering algorithm method to conceal the info
  - $\circ$  or  $\hat{H}$ , hashing algorithm method to transform (hash) the info
- *K*<sub>e</sub>, cipherkey parameter of the concealment methods
  - normally non-existent, for hashing
- *C*, ciphertext hidden information
  - or *h*, hash transformed info
- *D*, deciphering algorithm method to recover the original info
   o (does not apply for hashing)
- *K<sub>d</sub>*, deciphering key parameter of the recovering methods
   (does not apply for hashing)
- Note that, sometimes,
  - **E** = **D**
  - $K_e = K_d$  (symmetric cryptography)
- 1 PT: texto inteligível

...Generic Cryptographic System (cont.)

Notation:

- <u>Encipher operation</u>:  $C = E_{Ke}(P)$  or  $C = E(P, K_e)$  or  $C = K_e(P)$
- <u>Decipher operation</u>:  $P = D_{Kd}(C)$  or  $P = D(C, K_d)$  or  $P = K_d(C)$

• obviously,  $D_{Kd}(E_{Ke}(P)) = P$ 

- <u>Cryptographic hashing</u>: h = H(P) or F = H(P) or F = h(P)
- If
  - $K_e = K_d \longrightarrow$  symmetric cryptography
  - $K_e \neq K_d$  --> asymmetric cryptography
    - $K_e = K^+$ ;  $K_d = K^- -->$  public-key cryptography

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# Breaking cryptographic systems

### Attacks in traditional use

- <u>normal</u>
  - $\circ$  only the ciphertext is available
  - $\circ\;$  try to grasp the original text or, preferably, the deciphering key
- <u>known original text</u> ("passively" obtained)
  - both the original text and its enciphered counterpart are available
  - $\circ$   $\,$  try to grasp the deciphering key
- <u>planned original text</u> ("actively" prepared)
  - specific original texts are made to be enciphered
  - $\circ$   $\,$  try to grasp the deciphering key

## Attacks in added recent usage

- <u>find collisions</u>
  - get different documents with same fingerprint
    - any *P1*, *P2* pair (more easy birthday attack)
    - another *P*' for a specific *P* original (more difficult)

...Breaking cryptographic systems (cont.)

### in all cases, attack methods involve

- mathematics
- statistics
- intuition
- for an example, see Bishop: *Introduction*, Chap.8; *Art & Science*, chap.9!

# Ideal cryptographic system's requirements

- hard to break
  - $\circ$  in a reasonable future horizon
  - formal proof would be nice...
- easy to use
  - otherwise will be rejected or bypassed
- if broken, easily replaceable
  - this is a must, as systems **will** be broken!
  - depends on what was broken (type of secret)

# **Classification of cryptographic systems**

Perspective	Variant	Sub-variant	Examples
on the secret	secret algorithm		RC4 (originally)
	secret key(s)	single key, shared-key, symmetric	AES
		two-key, public key, asymmetric	RSA
on the method	stream <sup>1</sup>		RC4, One-time pad
	block	(pure)	AES, RSA <sup>2</sup> in ECB
		mixed	AES in CBC
on the purpose	bidirectional, reversible, two-way	confidentiality <sup>3</sup>	AES
		authentication <sup>4</sup>	RSA
	unidirectional, irreversible, one-way		MD5, SHA-2
	mixed	(confidentiality & integrity)	AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA1

1 PT: contínuo, sequencial

2 Many authors do not ever classify asymmetric systems (e.g. RSA) as "block", because of their inherent inefficiency...

3 Keys are temporary and efficient

4 Keys are personal and durable (long-lasting)

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# Classification of cryptographic systems: on the secret

## Types of secret

- secret algorithm
- secret key(s)

# Secret algorithm systems

Example:

• Discover the algorithm<sup>1</sup> that turns the phrase (French quotes are just delimiters): «Put more code, get more bugs.»

into

```
«Wklt!jx%f) {xm ~v"cojrvmx | !54w»
```

### Use:

- typically in military systems; also in commercial ones
- 1 and then tell me about it, because I have forgotten the algorithm!

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the secret

# Secret key's systems

- single key
- two-key

## Example:

• Knowing that a variant of "Caesar's cipher"<sup>1</sup> is being used (adapted to Latin 1, ISO 8859-1, table), find the "key" that turns the phrase:

«Put more code, get more bugs.»

into

```
«Sxw!npwj%lxmp7+igv#pruh#j}ou0»
```

### Use:

- common in many military, commercial and personal applications
- often, the two variants are used in conjunction (more on this later...)

1 apparently, the original Caesar's cipher used a simple "3" as key

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the secret

# Enciphering systems with key

### Symmetric, secret key, shared key

- $K_e = K_d = K$
- heuristic constructions:
  - very efficient computation; so, very suitable for large amounts of data
- difficult combination and sharing of key; so, preferred for closed environments
- e.g. AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)

## Asymmetric, public key, double-key

- $K_e = K^+ \neq K_d = K^-$
- math-based constructions:
  - $\circ$   $\,$  very heavy computation; so, not suitable for large amounts of data
- easy combination and exchange of keys; so, ideal for open environments
- e.g. RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)

# Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method

## **Enciphering methods for "long" texts**

- Encipher (and decipher)<sup>1</sup> operations have to be done in pieces (blocks)
  - pieces could be of 1 b, 1 B, 8 B,...
    - typical: 8 B (64 b) and 16 B (128 b)
- So, *plaintext P* is divided into parts of equal size:
  - $\circ \quad \mathbf{P} = \boldsymbol{P}_1 \boldsymbol{P}_2 \dots$
  - $\circ~$  each, is separately enciphered by one of the methods:
    - stream
    - block
    - "mix" of previous...

## Exercise:

- In practice, almost any text is "long". Why?
- 1 and hash

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method

## Stream method

- each part is enciphered with a different key  $K = K_1 K_2 \dots$
- $C = K(P) = K_1(P_1)K_2(P_2)...$
- if the number of keys is smaller than the number of parts, the method could be periodic (e.g. Vigenère's algorithm)
- Examples: Ronald Rivest's RC4 (ARC4), one-time pad

### Example:

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method - stream (cont.)

### Example of cryptographic technique: One-time Pad

- stream-type system
- random key (or cryptographically secure pseudo-random...)
- size of key equal to the the original text's
- key used only once
- $E = D = XOR(\oplus)$
- <u>Advantages</u>: proved unbreakable
- <u>Disadvantages</u>: exercise!

## enciphering:

- original text: *P*
- key: *K*
- enciphered text:  $C = P \oplus K$

## Exercise:

• The system is considered unbreakable; why is it not very much used?

### deciphering:

•  $P = C \oplus K$ 

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method

## **Block Method**

- each part of text, block, is enciphered with the same key *K*: ECB<sup>1</sup> mode
- $C = K(P) = K(P_1)K(P_2)...$
- Examples: AES, RSA<sup>2</sup>

### Example:



- 1 Electronic Code Book
- 2 Many texts do not consider RSA to be a block cipher, as it is not efficient enough to be used consecutively (block after block) in long documents. E.g., see section 3.5 of Peter Gutmann, *Lessons Learned in Implementing and Deploying Crypto Software*, 11th USENIX Security Symposium, 2002.

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method - block (cont.)

## Serious problem:

- with this method, identical blocks give identical codes!
- visual example:



Fig. a) original picture; b) enciphered with AES 256b, ECB mode

## Solutions to the problem<sup>1</sup>:

- mixing additional (and different) information per block!
  - Exs: CBC Cipher Block Chaining; OFM Output Feedback Mode; CTR – Counter Mode; ...
  - use random initialization values: IV (*initialization vector*)
- "solutions" are usually called "modes of operation" (of block ciphers...)
- 1 see More Advanced Topics

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method... CBC, Cipher Block Chaining



Fig. Use of CBC (*cipher block chaining*): a) enciphering; b) deciphering.

#### Exercise:

• Write the formulas for the encipherment (C as function of P) and vice versa.

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method... CTR, Counter Mode



Fig. Use of CTR (counter mode) in enciphering mode.

#### Exercises:

- Write the formulas for the encipherment (*C* as function of *P*) and vice versa.
- Draw a corresponding picture for the decipherment in CTR.

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the method (cont.)

# Padding

- size of block varies (in bits or bytes)
  - so, final block might need to be "padded"!
- important topic as padding is an attack vector!
- several schemes
  - e.g. PKCS<sup>1</sup> #7 grain is byte; add (block\_size P\_length mod block\_size) bytes; all with value equal to number of added bytes: e.g. if 3 bytes are needed to complete last block, each added byte's value is 3
- some "modes of operation" do not need padding (why?)<sup>2</sup>

### Final comment on solutions for the Block method:

- several of these methods are still vulnerable (e.g. see Kaufman et. al, Network Security, pp. 98-101)
- counter-measures: use <u>authenticated modes</u><sup>3</sup>, safer algorithms...
- 1 Public Key Cryptography Standards
- 2 see More Advanced Topics
- 3 see More Advanced Topics

# Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose

### **Purpose types**

- bidirectional, reversible (*two-way*)
- unidirectional, irreversible (*one-way*)
- "mix" of previous

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose

# Reversible (or bidirectional, *two-way*) encipherment:

#### Usage area

- Confidentiality
- (Authentication)<sup>1</sup>
- ((Integrity checking))<sup>2</sup>



Fig. Usage of two-way cryptography.

- 1 not main purpose
- 2 difficult to use in practice, as vulnerable to attacks

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose... Reversible (cont.)

# (Desired) Properties of the bidirectional algorithm:

### Simplicity:

- the enciphering of the *plaintext P* (with *K*<sub>e</sub>) is (relatively) easy;
- the deciphering of the *ciphertext C* (with *K*<sub>d</sub>) also is.

### Resistance:

• given a plaintext *P* and its ciphered counterpart *C*, it is impractical<sup>1</sup> to compute the key *K*, used to produce  $C = E_K(P)$ 

### Uniqueness:

• given a plaintext *P* and a key *K*, it is impractical to compute another key *K*' such as  $E_K(P) = E_K(P)$ 

1 impractical = currently, computationally infeasible

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose

Irreversible (or unidirectional, *one-way*) "encipherment"<sup>1</sup>:

#### Use area

- Authentication
- Integrity checking



Fig. Usage of one-way cryptography for integrity checking.

1 more like transformation

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose... Irreversible (cont.)

### Basic idea:

- from an original text, compute an array of bytes that is characteristic of the text (*hash value*, *digest*, *fingerprint* [, *checksum*<sup>1</sup>])
- (The original text is not recoverable from the hash!)

### Usually,

- a key is not necessary: h = H(P)
- the hash value has a fixed length
- the hashing function is somewhat akin to database dispersion functions, but has very different features and purpose

1 *checksum*'s common use (in communication coding) does not convey needed cryptographic strength (e.g. uniqueness)

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose... Irreversible (cont.)

# (Desired) Properties of the unidirectional algorithm:

Simplicity:

• the transformation of the original text is easy

### No reversibility (or pre-image resistance):

• it is impractical<sup>1</sup> to invert the function  $H: P \neq H^{-1}(F)^{-2}$ 

### Uniqueness (or collision resistance):

- it is impractical to find two texts *P1* and *P2* such that H(P1) = H(P2)
- **Variant**: weak collision resistance<sup>3</sup> or 2nd pre-image resistance
  - for a given specified text *P*, it is impractical to find a text *P*' such that H(P) = H(P').
- 1 impractical = currently, computationally infeasible
- 2 *F* from Fingerprint
- 3 "weak", because this type of collision resistance is more easily achieved



...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose...

# Mix of bidirectional encipherment and unidirectional transformation:

#### Use area

- Confidentiality & Integrity protection
  - so called Authenticated Encipherment<sup>1</sup>



Fig. Usage of mixed two-way and one-way cryptography.

1 see More Advanced Topics

...Classification of cryptographic systems: on the purpose... Mix (cont.)

# (Desired) Properties of the *mixed* algorithm:

### Simplicity:

- the enciphering/enciphering of the *plaintext P/ciphertext C* is (relatively) easy;
- the unidirectional transformation for integrity protection also is.

### Resistance:

given *P* / *C* pairs, it is impractical<sup>1</sup> to compute the key *K*, used to produce *C* = *E<sub>K</sub>*(*P*)

### Uniqueness:

• given a *P* / *C* pair it is impractical to compute another *C*' such that will, unnoticed, decipher into a different *P*'

1 impractical = currently, computationally infeasible

# Randomness

- essential in Cryptography!
  - $\circ$  one time pad, IV (initialization values), stream cipher seeds
  - o hashes
  - *nonces*, key generation (TLS, RSA...) ...
- generation
  - excellent: physical source
    - inherent
      - radioactive decay, Brownian movement, ...
    - depending on initial conditions
      - (non-biased) roulette or dice, ...
  - reasonable: algorithmic-based with physical seed
    - cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators
      - use physical (hopefully random) sources (e.g. mouse movements)
      - Linux's getrandom() (/dev/random, /dev/urandom)
  - bad: algorithmic-based
    - pseudorandom number generators
      - POSIX's random()

### ...Randomness

- random oracle
  - (ideal) function that
    - for each input, outputs a unique and (truly) random value, uniformly distributed in the infinite output codomain;
    - is deterministic: always outputs the same value every time the same input is submitted.
  - $\circ$  idealized cryptographic hash function (for finite output codomain)
  - used as a reference for proofs of security of algorithms, protocols...

# **Cryptographic libraries**

- essential in cryptographic programming
  - encryption, hashing, signing... different algorithms... all ready to use
    - perhaps, coupled with a "cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator"
  - why not build a library?
    - it is not just implementing algorithms, it's how they are used, how "random" numbers are generated and chosen, etc.
- examples
  - OpenSSL: the reference!<sup>1</sup>
    - components: application & C library
    - EVP (envelope) API level (lab classes)
  - WebCrypto: JavaScript (by W3C)
  - Bouncy Castle: Java and C# (by Australia's Legion...)
  - Libgcrypt: C (OpenPGP library) (by GnuPG community)
  - PyCryptodome: Phyton

1 in spite of same infamous bugs, such as *The Heartbleed Bug* (heartbleed.com)

# **Cryptographic transformations**

- <u>Transposition</u> exchange (swapping) of positions of elements *P*-box
- <u>Substitution</u> exchange of elements (e.g. Caeser's cipher) *S*-box
- <u>Combination</u> transposition and substitution cascade *product cipher*
- Shannon: operations should cause
  - *diffusion* each plaintext char affecting many ciphertext chars
  - *confusion* ciphertext depending complexly on key



Cryptographic transformations: a) permutation box; b) substitution box; c) "complete" system. Exercise: find out the algorithms for P- and S- boxes and validate them with c).

# Some famous cryptographic algorithms

- RC4: stream key generation (1987, needs medication)
- DES: reversible system, secret key (1975, defunct)
- AES: reversible system, secret key (1998, still healthy)
- RSA: reversible system, public key (1977, still healthy)
- MD5: irreversible system (1992, defunct)
- SHA-2<sup>1</sup>: irreversible system (2001, still healthy)
- SHA-3<sup>2</sup>: irreversible system (2015, yet in phase of wide adoption)

1 About SHA-1 end of life, see <u>sha-mbles.github.io</u>

2 Is based on new paradigm - sponge construction (keccak.team/sponge\_duplex.html).

# Some numbers...

•	$2^8 = 256$	number of values represented by a byte		
•	$2^{32} = 4\ 294\ 967\ 296$	maximum number of IPv4 addresses		
		$\simeq$ 0,6 * number of people on Earth in 2018		
•	$2^{56} = 72\ 057\ 594\ 037\ 927\ 936$	number of different keys for DES algorithm		
•	• $2^{64} = 18\ 446\ 744\ 073\ 709\ 551\ 616$			
	1+ number of grains of wheat in chess board (from 1, doubled in each square)			
•	$2^{76} \simeq 7 \times 10^{22}$	mass of the Moon in kg		
•	$2^{79} \simeq 6 \times 10^{23}$	Avogadro's constant		
•	$2^{82} \simeq 6 \times 10^{24}$	mass of the Earth in kg		
•	$2^{101} \simeq 2 \times 10^{30}$	mass of the Sun in kg		
<ul> <li>2<sup>128</sup> = 340 282 366 920 938 463 463 374 607 431 768 211 456 maximum number of IPv6 addresses</li> </ul>				
•	$2^{256} \simeq 10^{77}$	number of values of SHA-256 hash		
•	$2^{280} \simeq 10^{84}$ number of fund	damental particles in the observable universe		

# Pointers...

- The **"Public-key cryptography paper**", 1976 W. Diffie , M. E. Hellman
  - <u>www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/24.pdf</u>
- The "**RSA paper**", 1978 R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman
   <u>dx.doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342</u>
- The "**ElGamal Signature Scheme**", 1985 Taher Elgamal
  - <u>ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=01057074</u>
- The "DES Cryptanalysis paper", 1977 W. Diffie , M. E. Hellman
   www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/publications/27.pdf
- The "**Rijndael**, **AES Proposal**", 1999 Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen
  - <u>citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.36.640</u>
- The "MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", 1992, R. Rivest
  - o tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1321
- The **"The Keccak SHA-3 submission**", 2011, G. Bertoni et al.
  - o <u>keccak.team/files/Keccak-submission-3.pdf</u>
- The "Crypto Mini-FAQ", Internet FAQ Archives, -2014, Roger Schlafly
  - <u>www.faqs.org/faqs/crypto/faq/</u>